Proxy-Peace for Ukraine: The Case of Saudi Arabia

The global system of international relations cannot remain in a constant militaristic rhythm due to the natural inclination of mass populations toward a peaceful agenda. This is why discussions about peace initiatives in war are always necessary. It is in Ukraine’s interest to ensure that any diplomatic conversations about peace remain controlled and managed by us, taking into account our fundamental principles and national interests to the fullest extent.

The objective is to prevent Russia from implementing its strategy of a proxy-peace initiative led by loyal third-party countries—one that would cater to the Kremlin’s demands and prematurely halt its inevitable defeat on the battlefield. To be clear, this is about shaping the informational narrative surrounding peace initiatives, not about negotiating with Russia tomorrow.

We can call this situation a “public competition for peace.” In the first half of 2023, we saw four attempts to launch negotiation tracks: China’s “peace initiative,” the Vatican’s mediation mission, the African nations’ diplomatic tour, and Indonesia’s peace plan. None of these efforts proved viable for various reasons. To maintain initiative and leadership in this domain, Ukraine—engaged in an existential war with Russia—is pushing for a Global Peace Summit and seeking the adoption of President Zelensky’s Peace Formula.

The weakest link in our project remains the stance of key Global South countries. At present, there is a risk that, due to objective factors, they may lean toward an anti-Western narrative in the Ukrainian issue, perceiving Ukraine as merely an American outpost.

Some of these nations might be inclined to view China’s seemingly neutral political position favorably. Beijing, after all, has a vested interest in constructing a quasi-anti-American axis around itself and, so far, passively promotes a war-ending scenario that is unfavorable to Ukraine. This is why Ukraine needs a platform for dialogue with major and interested countries from Asia, Africa, and Latin America—to leverage a “soft power” strategy and shape a peace initiative that aligns more with Ukraine’s interests.

Why is this important? A prime example is the intense battle over condemning Russia’s actions in Ukraine, which played out during the preparations for the Brussels Summit between Latin America and the EU. Negotiations on the Ukrainian issue ended in defeat for the Europeans, as they failed to secure firm language of support for Ukraine in the final documents. European states were unable to convince Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela to acknowledge Russia’s responsibility for its aggression. EU representatives were particularly disappointed by Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s refusal to accept any strong wording against Russia.

The Wall Street Journal recently published a significant piece of news: Saudi Arabia has initiated peace talks regarding Ukraine, involving approximately 30 countries, which are expected to take place on August 5-6 in the “economic capital” of Saudi Arabia—Jeddah. Delegations from Brazil, India, Indonesia, South Africa, Egypt, Mexico, Chile, Zambia, and others will attend. Western states, including Poland, the United Kingdom, and other EU countries, are also expected to participate. Notably, Russia has not been invited, which is an important detail.

This will effectively be the first attempt to scale a peace initiative for Ukraine, aiming to overshadow the self-serving, localized peace plans from certain countries, particularly China, which often demonstrate greater loyalty to Russia. Some Global South countries wish to find a “golden middle” in their stance toward the Russian-Ukrainian war but are not inclined to mirror China’s position.

In this context, Saudi Arabia is seen as a promising platform. The country has maintained a balancing neutrality in the war between Russia and Ukraine, refusing to join Western sanctions but promising Ukraine a $400 million financial aid package in February 2023. Additionally, Saudi Arabia condemned Russia’s invasion at the United Nations General Assembly.

It’s important to note that Saudi Arabia has experience in effective mediation, particularly in prisoner exchanges. In September 2022, with Riyadh’s help, Moscow released 215 Ukrainian soldiers, including fighters from the Azov Regiment. The country also initiated an invitation to President Zelensky for the Arab League summit.

Riyadh is currently interested in stabilizing its dialogue with the United States and seeks to use the Ukraine war case as an opportunity to repair relations after the fallout from journalist Jamal Khashoggi’s murder, the U.S.’s decreasing political presence in the Middle East, and Iran’s rising activity.

On one hand, Saudi Arabia is not opposed to irking the U.S. by expanding economic cooperation with Russia, particularly within the OPEC framework. Relations with Moscow are, in fact, becoming a tool for exerting pressure on the West and a means of boosting political support in the region.

On the other hand, despite the recent rapprochement with Iran through Chinese mediation, Tehran remains the greatest security and geopolitical threat to Riyadh. Saudi Arabia is not enthusiastic about the growing military-technical cooperation between Russia and Iran and the latter’s increasing influence in Syria. Thus, indirect and soft support for Ukraine is seen as a means of balancing the Russia-Iran alliance.

However, Saudi Arabia will avoid direct solidarity with the Western assessment of the war in Ukraine, as it does not want to be perceived as a Western ally. At the same time, Riyadh needs to ensure that neither the West nor Global South countries interpret its balancing position as veiled support for Putin.

An additional danger lies in the possibility that the West could use the peace dialogue involving Global South countries to indirectly promote a negotiation track as an inevitable reality in the evolution of the conflict in Eastern Europe. Primarily, this would be to avoid appearing as a force pushing Ukraine toward a difficult and potentially unjust peace. There’s an assumption that using Saudi Arabia or other countries in this manner could be strategically advantageous for the U.S., without damaging the critical U.S.-Ukraine strategic relationship.

What should Ukraine’s objectives be at this stage in the formation of the negotiation platform?

First, Ukraine should aim to secure the adoption and endorsement of its formula for restoring territorial sovereignty within internationally recognized borders, including Crimea, by as many Global South countries as possible.

Second, Ukraine should leverage the dialogue in Saudi Arabia as a stepping stone to gradually and softly integrate Global South countries into the Ukrainian format of the Global Peace Summit. In other words, Ukraine should use “soft power” tools.

Some countries may find it difficult to support Ukraine immediately and unequivocally due to local anti-American sentiments and the perception of Ukraine as a pro-American state, as well as fears of losing access to the Russian market and trade dynamics with Moscow. It’s crucial to remember that these positions will constrain Ukraine’s diplomatic efforts.