Did Orbán Prepare to Take Control of Transcarpathia in 2022?

As Russian tanks and helicopters advanced on Kyiv in 2022, Viktor Orbán appeared to be preparing a knife in Ukraine’s back. Hungary, it seems, was considering exploiting Russia’s invasion to establish control over Transcarpathia. I raised this possibility back in 2022; now the time has come to assemble the pieces into a coherent picture.

Yesterday, Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) once again reminded the public that in 2025 its counterintelligence uncovered a Hungarian agent network operating in Transcarpathia. These agents collected intelligence on military infrastructure—air defense systems, military units, even the black market in weapons—as well as on local public sentiment in the event of Hungarian forces entering the region. The network was reportedly run by intelligence officer Zoltán Andre. To reiterate: they were measuring public attitudes toward the possible arrival of the Hungarian army.

Of course, Hungary would have been unlikely to risk a full-scale invasion due to the constraints of NATO membership. But in 2022, Orbán could have framed such a move as a peacekeeping mission aimed at protecting the Hungarian minority—a kind of “defensive” intervention. Hungarian-Ukrainian relations were already strained: disputes over language and education laws, the distribution of Hungarian passports in Transcarpathia, and Budapest’s obstruction of Ukraine’s NATO integration had all heated tensions to a boiling point.

One key question remains unresolved at the official level: how coordinated were the actions of Russia and Hungary in 2022? A recent scandal—in which Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó allegedly passed confidential EU meeting information to Sergey Lavrov—suggests that Moscow may have encouraged Orbán to play a more active role in aggression against Ukraine. It is also plausible that intelligence gathered by Hungarian operatives was shared with Moscow through networks later exposed by the SBU.

Let us recall some key facts. In May 2022, Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council Secretary Oleksiy Danilov stated live on air that Hungary had been informed in advance by Vladimir Putin about the impending invasion and believed it could claim part of Ukraine’s territory. The NSDC may have relied on classified intelligence that could become public in the near future.

On February 1—just 24 days before the full-scale invasion—Orbán visited Moscow. Danilov later claimed that it was during this meeting that Putin warned him of the coming attack. Shortly afterward, the Slovak conservative outlet Postoj reported that Orbán and Putin shared a “common strategy” to revise borders and unite Hungarians in the Carpathian Basin through potential military action. At the time, Slovaks appeared alarmed, fearing that Hungary might pursue aggressive intentions toward its neighbors under the pretext of protecting national minorities. Hungary has long harbored ambitions of revisiting the legacy of the Treaty of Trianon following World War I.

On February 22, Hungary announced Operation “Eastern Shield” and began deploying ground forces, aircraft, and special units to the Ukrainian border, warning that the war could spill into Transcarpathia. Tanks, including T-72s, and even military pontoon bridges were moved to the frontier. The core of the deployment was the 5th István Bocskai Infantry Brigade, stationed at the Ádám Vay base just 100 kilometers from the Ukrainian border—roughly a 90–120 minute drive along a direct route.

Why did Hungary move troops to the border 48 hours before the first Russian soldier set foot on Ukrainian soil?

This suggests that Budapest had prior knowledge of the scale and timing of Russia’s invasion. Notably, on February 23 Orbán visited his military’s operational center, where a map displayed the figure “600,000.” Officially, this referred to the expected number of refugees—but it may have served as a convenient cover.

Were these preparations really about receiving refugees—or about establishing logistical readiness for a potential advance if Ukrainian defenses collapsed? Refugee management does not require heavy mechanized units or tanks. Such assets point to military planning, not humanitarian assistance. If the concern was truly refugees, why wasn’t civilian infrastructure—housing, logistics, medical facilities—being expanded instead?

On the social network X (formerly Twitter), many Hungarian users at the time questioned why Russia was not striking Transcarpathia with missiles, speculating about a possible agreement between Budapest and Moscow.

In 2023, former European Parliament member Radosław Sikorski hinted in an interview with Radio Zet that Orbán had a contingency plan for the “partition of Ukraine” in the event of Kyiv’s fall.

In November 2022, Orbán attended a football match wearing a scarf depicting “Greater Hungary,” which included Ukrainian Transcarpathia. In 2024, László Toroczkai, leader of the far-right party Our Homeland, openly stated that Transcarpathia could become Hungarian if Ukraine were to collapse. Narratives about dividing Ukraine were actively promoted in the region, likely with Russian backing.

Had Kyiv fallen to Putin in 2022, there is a high probability that Orbán would have ignored pressure from Brussels and launched a “peacekeeping” operation in the gray-zone style: crossing the border under the guise of a humanitarian mission and temporary protection of Transcarpathia. This scenario did not materialize—largely thanks to Ukraine’s Armed Forces and the position of the United States.

Admittedly, the Hungarian army at the time was relatively weak and unprepared, and Orbán himself is less a decisive wartime leader than a shrewd dealmaker and tactician. But had the situation for Ukraine deteriorated further, he might well have attempted an occupation maneuver in Transcarpathia. Orbán was, it seems, betting on Ukraine’s collapse.