Facebook “Bookmarks,” Americans, and Image Change: The Latvian Lesson in Political Strategy

When discussing Ukraine’s political landscape, the fragmentation of voters among numerous parties is often emphasized. In such a mosaic, there is no clear favorite, making it difficult to predict who will take power after the elections.

A similar situation occurred in the recent elections in Latvia, where just 100 seats in the Saeima were divided among seven political forces.

The pro-Russian party “Harmony” secured 19.8%, the populists “Who Owns the State?” (KPV LV) received 14.25%, the New Conservative Party got 13.59%, the “Development/For!” party won 12.04%, the National Alliance gained 11.01%, the Union of Greens and Farmers (the former ruling party) received 9.91%, and “New Unity” obtained 6.69%.

As Ukraine approaches its own elections, it is particularly interesting to examine which political technologies succeeded—and which failed—during the Latvian elections.

After all, within a year, we may see copies of some of these strategies in Ukraine.

Voting in Advance

The election system in Latvia is quite different from Ukraine’s. Like in several other EU countries, Latvia uses open party lists. One hundred deputies are elected in five multi-member districts, and each voter can not only vote for a party list but also for specific candidates by marking a “plus” next to one or more candidates from a selected party.

Candidates who receive more “pluses” move up the list, meaning that those who secured their spots through party conventions are not necessarily guaranteed a seat. Only those who earn the voters’ support and whose party surpasses the 5% threshold nationally become deputies.

This long-anticipated innovation has yet to gain traction in Ukraine’s parliament. However, Latvia also has legal provisions that could inspire electoral strategists in Ukraine.

First, Latvian voters are not tied to their registered residence and can vote at any polling station. Second, early voting is permitted, allowing voters to cast their ballots up to three days before the election date (“vote in storage”). However, unlike neighboring Estonia, Latvia does not practice electronic voting.

Additionally, Latvia imposes strict restrictions on pre-election campaigning.

Thirty days before the election, political advertising on television is banned.

In the final, decisive month, parties lose access to the most powerful advertising medium!

On the eve of voting, a total ban on political advertising comes into effect—covering radio, the internet, print media, and public spaces. The experience of banning paid online advertising is particularly worth studying in Ukraine ahead of the 2019 presidential and parliamentary elections.

The Facebook Campaign

Almost all political forces began campaigning earlier than the law permitted, aiming to get ahead of their competitors. The biggest spenders in this election were the Union of Greens and Farmers and New Unity, with election expenses reaching €44,000 per parliamentary seat—a significant sum for a small country like Latvia.

Political figures appeared on magazine covers, newspapers filled mailboxes, speeches dominated radio broadcasts, and TV ads flooded the airwaves—just like everywhere else.

But in 2018, running a campaign exclusively through traditional media was unacceptable. Social media had become so powerful that ignoring it was simply dangerous. For instance, around 700,000 Latvians—nearly half of the electorate—use Facebook.

Thus, the future election winner, the “Harmony” party, led by Riga Mayor Nils Ušakovs, aggressively pursued social media promotion—sometimes through questionable means.

For example, a year and a half before the election, Facebook and Instagram accounts called “Riga Online” appeared, featuring engaging everyday content. These accounts quickly amassed a large audience. Then, six months before the election, these profiles were suddenly converted into “Harmony” party pages!

However, following multiple complaints, Facebook eventually shut them down.

Experts noted that “Harmony” had the most professional pages, largely due to substantial financial investment and attractive visual content.

The party also made extensive use of paid advertising. Their audience was clearly divided into two groups: ethnic Latvians and ethnic Russians. Content focused on the achievements of Riga’s municipal administration and Mayor Ušakovs while criticizing national policies.

If campaign spending on social media were a measure of efficiency, KPV LV was arguably the most effective party. The two-year-old populist party built a massive audience without using paid advertising. Their party page alone gathered 12,000 genuine followers, and their leaders attracted even more support on personal accounts. The key to their success was high-quality, critical content targeting protest voters with bold rhetoric.

The New Conservative Party created 20 separate pages for major cities, while their central page aggressively criticized opponents and promoted a consolidated agenda using infographics and video content.

Some parties (such as the “Progressives,” who failed to enter the Saeima) experimented with “micro-targeting.” Specialists worked with small, targeted interest groups, focusing on issues like environmental concerns, women’s rights, and the rule of law. The campaign centered on party ideologies and specific proposals to address these issues. However, this strategy proved insufficient for victory.

Other political forces were less active in social media promotion. For instance, the Union of Greens and Farmers relied primarily on ecological advertising and showed limited engagement on social media. Instead, the ruling party focused on regional newspapers—which resulted in a disappointing outcome, dropping them to sixth place.

Overseas Political Consulting

Ukraine experienced a surge of foreign political consultants a decade ago. In Latvia, this remains a modern trend.

The frontrunner in this election, “Harmony,” employed the services of American political consultant Christian Ferry, whose clients have included U.S. senators and presidential candidates, including the late John McCain. Interestingly, Latvian media reported that Ferry had previously consulted for Ukraine’s former President Yanukovych.

The ruling force, the Union of Greens and Farmers, also hired a foreign specialist—British political strategist Alastair Campbell, the former press secretary of ex-Prime Minister Tony Blair. However, this did little to help, as the party lost 10 seats.

Meanwhile, “Harmony” executed the most successful election strategy.

The main challenge for “Harmony” and its leader, Ušakovs, was shedding their long-standing image as pro-Russian politicians. For years, Ušakovs advocated lifting sanctions on Russia, frequently visited Moscow, and met with Russian officials, including then-Prime Minister Medvedev and Moscow Mayor Sobyanin and Russian Orthodox Patriarch Kirill. . In 2011, he supported granting Russian official language status in Latvia, even managing to organize a referendum (which ultimately failed).

These stances secured Russian-speaking votes in the 2011 and 2014 parliamentary elections, but despite winning, “Harmony” remained in opposition.

This time, the strategy changed.

Ušakovs suddenly supported NATO deployments in Latvia, severed ties with Russia’s ruling “United Russia” party, and condemned the annexation of Crimea. To solidify his new image, he even posted a selfie in front of American tanks arriving in Riga’s port.

Most strikingly, “Harmony” deputies avoided the topic of Russian-language schools.

Many analysts predicted this would alienate the party’s core voters, leading to electoral collapse. However, “Harmony” once again emerged victorious, losing only one parliamentary seat.

This was the result of a well-executed media campaign that distanced the party from radical movements on both the Latvian and Russian sides. By positioning itself as a moderate center-left force, “Harmony” managed to prevent its pro-Russian voters from defecting to the more radical “Russian Union of Latvia” (which failed to enter parliament).

The Role of Age

Election data revealed that Harmony’s strongest support came from voters aged 30–59, while the party performed weakest among those 60 and older.

By contrast, the Union of Greens and Farmers relied heavily on voters aged 60–69—a predictable outcome, given that the party underestimated the importance of an online campaign.

As for younger voters (18–29), they overwhelmingly backed the populist KPV LV, with smaller shares supporting Harmony and the Union of Greens and Farmers.

Some parties also displayed clear gender imbalances among their supporters. For example, KPV LV’s voter base was predominantly male. This was largely due to the party’s communication style, which tailored its messaging to align with traditionally masculine perspectives.